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When I began to write this paper, I was surprised to learn that it had
been five years since I had undertaken a serious intellectual analysis of
American Labor Law. My last effort had been as Chief Counsel to
President Clinton's Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations. That had begun as an enlightening and enjoyable experience,
but it had a rather frustrating closing. The Commission completed its
Report-one that did not follow my advice as to the proper way to embark
upon labor law reform-just as Newt Gingrich was being installed as
Speaker of the House.
Needless to say, there have been major developments since then in
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both the White House and the Speaker's offices. As has been true for the
last four decades, however, there has been no significant reform of this
country's labor laws. Now that we have entered the twenty-first century, it
is time for we Americans to rethink the issues and have our politicians
address them properly.
Over the last quarter century, there have been a host of proposals for
revisions of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").' Any such
proposals, however, generate totally partisan stances for or against them,
and ultimately a political logjam rather than a public policy
accomplishment. The previous era had apparently been an order of
magnitude more productive in this field. The 1935 Wagner Act,2 the 1947
Taft-Hartley Act,3 and the 1959 Landrum-Griffm Act4 each made major
changes in labor law. However, the political process was equally, if not
more partisan at that time, with the Wagner Act biased in favor of unions
and against employers, and the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts
biased in favor of employers and against unions.' This is not the role
model I would like to see us follow in the future.
The aim of true labor law-indeed, any law reform--should not be to
confer selected political benefits on the constituencies that happened to
support the governing party in the last election. Instead, reform should
reflect systematic policy analysis of real world problems and principled
adoption of appropriate solutions-no matter who happens to be the winner
or loser on a particular item. This is the only way we can ensure that the
government will be fair to the people who are directly affected by its
actions, and not just react to the positions of those organizations with
political clout.
In the case of labor law, the key interests are those of workers, rather
than the unions who represent them or the companies who employ them.
The interests of workers are actually quite complex. Sometimes they
coincide with the position of the union, sometimes with that of the
employer, and sometimes with neither. In addition, there is an interplay
amongst different legal rules and reforms. Sometimes, the rules are
mutually reinforcing, but often they are in tension. By analogy, in my
1. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)).
2. See id.
3. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
4. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959
("LMRDA"), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
5. I should note that this is true of the parts of the Landrum-Griffin Act that revised the
NLRA. The bulk of that 1959 legislation was embodied in the LMRDA, which was
designed to restrain internal union affairs on behalf of members.
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appraisal of tort law and reform, especially medical malpractice,6 I have
always asserted that the principal focus of attention should be the interests
not of doctors nor lawyers, but rather patients. However, as patients we all
wear several hats-not just as people who need protection from injury, but
also as those who ultimately pay the bill for what the law does to offer such
protection. The same is true for those of us who are workers, and that is
why we need and deserve a fair-minded analysis of whether the gains we
are receiving from the law are worth the costs we ultimately are bearing.
The fact that labor law reform, like tort reform, has instead been so
partisan and logjam-generating has created another institutional flaw. The
major features of present-day labor law are actually the work of the
Supreme Court rather than Congress. As a matter of democratic principle,
it seems inappropriate that a tiny majority of five lifetime-tenured Justices
should be writing the rules that shape the fate of ordinary American
workers, rather than regularly-elected members of Congress who are
supposed to be responsive to worker interests. Even worse, the Court's
rulings are all rendered in particular cases, sometimes without a lot of
thought about the general formulation, usually without any systematic
analysis of its interplay with other parts of labor law, and rarely with real
appreciation of the current practical realities of the workplace.
Furthermore, because the Court believes that labor law is the responsibility
of the Congress that enacted the NLRA, later Court members are almost
always unwilling to rethink their earlier rulings even when subsequent real
world experience and scholarly analysis has demonstrated their flaws.
However, unlike other parts of our statutory legal system (e.g., corporate
securities law and tax law), the Congress has been unable and/or unwilling
to rework labor law for four full decades.
11. LABOR AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
A vivid illustration of both the problem and the appropriate solution
can be found in the role of labor law in campaign financing and the latter's
non-reform in America. There is no doubt that we have a major problem
here. As an index of the problem's dimensions, back in 1964 the total
amount spent on all federal, state, and local campaigns was $200 million,
while in 1996 it was $4 billion-up 20-fold in just three decades. A reform
proposal that is quite popular with the general public would impose on
"soft money" gifts to parties much the same kinds of restraints that now
apply to direct "hard money" donations to candidates. To help fend off that
effort (so far successfully), the Republican leadership has pressed instead
(both in Congress and referenda in states like California) for a Paycheck
6. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991).
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Protection Act that would require every labor union spending money in a
political campaign (whether via party donations or supportive
advertisements) to secure consent in writing from each and every union
member before any part of his or her union dues could be devoted to the
political process (as is now required for direct union contributions to
candidates). Both the AFL-CIO and the Democrats (including President
Clinton) concentrated their efforts on successfully defeating that proposed
amendment, but paid the price of securing no campaign finance reform at
all.
What I told the people in Washington (as well as in my Harvard labor
law classes) was that this was a justifiable legal reform, but that one key
addition was necessary: as a matter of principle, I believe that union
members should have the right to opt out of their dues money being spent
on the campaign of a political party with which they disagree, and that they
themselves are going to vote against.7 During these debates, though, I was
struck by how little of the discussions in Congress or the media adverted to
the current (and one-sided) legal restraints now imposed on such union
political expenditures-restraints created by liberal Justices on the
Supreme Court.
On its face, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act permitted unions to negotiate
with willing employers a union-though not a closed-shop contract
provision (i.e., a clause that would require membership, only 30 days after
the person had been employed, as a condition of employment and
enforceable against that employee only if membership was available to
him). Sixteen years later, in NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,' the Supreme
Court read that statutory language as not requiring actual membership in
the union, but only payment of dues to the union. That same day, in Retail
Clerks International Ass'n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn,9 the Court used
that formula to eliminate what unions had always believed was their
freedom to negotiate: payment of union dues as a condition of employment
in so-called "right to work" statesl--although again on its face the
language of this section 14(b) permits states to eliminate "membership"
requirements from the parties' collective agreements.1' And in a series of
7. In the 1990's, while almost all union expenditures were made on behalf of
Democratic candidates, between 25% and 30% of all union households contained at least
one family member who voted for Republican candidates.
8. 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
9. 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
10. These are states that grant such a right to work only as against the employees'
union, not as against their employer.
11. The General Motors case is very significant in labor-not just political-disputes.
This is the reason that, in a strike action supported by a majority of employees, dissidents
who either have not joined the union or have chosen to resign are free to cross that line and
undercut the concerted efforts of the employee group. And if that collective worker effort
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related decisions (International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street12 under the
Railway Labor Act ("RLA") and Communications Workers of America v.
Beck13 under the NLRA), the Justices have ruled that in "non-right to work"
states, members of the bargaining unit who exercise this judicially-created
freedom to choose not to join the union have a right to request a rebate of
the share of their dues that was spent by their union bargaining agent for
political activities.'
4
The campaign reform proposal favored by Republicans would give to
union members the same political rebate rights now enjoyed by unit
members. The understandable response of Democrats and the AFL-CIO is
that employees who voluntarily choose to join the union should then be
bound by the political decisions their elected organization and officials
make. This position is plausible under the current Court-created law of
union security clauses. It still is the case, though, that employees must join
their union if they want to have a role in electing their representatives,
voting to strike or ratifying contracts covering their jobs. In any event, if
one views this from the perspective of employees as citizens, not as
members of a labor organization that they belong to on their jobs, we
should revise the law along the lines of what the Republicans have
proposed.
Giving union, as well as unit members, the option to decide whether
they want their dues money spent on the party supported by the union
would entitle (and hopefully induce) workers to focus their attention on the
position their union-supported candidates have adopted, and thence decide
whether they agree with the union and the candidate on that issue. Such
concentration of each union member's political attention might also lead
them (and their family members) to think about whether, and for whom, to
does succeed in a "right to work" state, the combination of Schernerhorn and the Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) duty of fair representation of all unit-not
just union-members means that the "free rider" employees are legally entitled to all of the
benefits secured by the union through contract negotiations and administration, without
having to pay a penny of the price.
12. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
13. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
14. Justice Brennan refused Justice Black's invitation to use the First Amendment to
impose this restraint on what Congress could authorize unions to do with dues. He instead
read all of this into the Taft-Hartley Act's wording of what Congress had authorized in union
security clauses. One further consequence of this doctrinal formula was that in Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984) (decided under
the RLA), a later Court held that employees are entitled not just to rebates of political
expenditures, but also to amounts spent by the union in organizing drives elsewhere. These
union efforts were found unrelated to collective bargaining and representation of the
immediate unit, even though from any realistic economic perspective the degree of union
organization of the relevant work force is crucial in determining the level of pay and
benefits that can be secured for the immediate unit.
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vote in the political campaign. 5 That would help reduce the current "grass
roots" failure by Americans to vote in elections, which is now one of the
most pathological features of American life.
16
There is, however, a crucial addition that should have been part of the
Republican proposal (though, unsurprisingly, it was not). The opt-out
rebate right should be available not only to members of unions, but also to
members of other organizations such as the National Rifle Association
(NRA), the American Association of Retired People (AARP), and most
importantly, to the shareholder-members of corporations. A considerable
number of ordinary working Americans-not just the wealthy-now own
corporate shares, especially through their pension and retirement plans, and
if partial privatization of Social Security takes place, this ownership will be
mandated by another federal law. It has always seemed to me that citizens
should have exactly the same rebate right in their corporate dividends as in
their union dues, to reflect the share of their money that is going to political
campaigns they do not support. 17 After all, the Taft-Hartley Congress
followed that principle in 1947 when it imposed upon unions the same
"voluntary" standard required of corporations in collecting "hard" money to
be donated to candidates.
Thus, my reaction to the Republican proposal is that it is the
functional equivalent of Major League Baseball imposing a "hard" salary
cap on smaller-market franchises, like the Pittsburgh Pirates and Kansas
City Athletics, in order to protect these teams and their fans from the
pressure to spend too much money on players; the same cap would not,
however, be imposed on the large-market New York Yankees and Los
Angeles Dodgers, because they are said to have so much money that they
do not "need" protection. Creating a level playing field in the political
(even more than in the sports) arena requires application of the same
governing standard to parties on both sides of the table-here to protect the
political rights not only of citizens who may be members of the UAW or
the Teamsters, but also those who are shareholders in General Motors and
UPS (as well as the non-unionized Microsoft).
15. One important change that I believe should be made to this Republican proposal is
that union members should have to file a written request in order to secure a political dues
rebate, rather than the union having to seek written consent from every union member. Not
only are there significant transactional economics in the latter arrangement, but it would
serve the purpose of having American union members affirmatively make a political
decision, rather than a non-decision.
16. The voting gap is greatest between younger, high-school educated, lower-paid
workers and older, college-educated, higher-paid workers (or retirees).
17. Needless to say, corporations, in the aggregate, spend many times the amount in
political campaigns than unions do.
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III. CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF AMERICAN WORKERS
Hopefully, one by-product of the inducement to American employee-
citizens to focus their attention on whom they want to support in political
campaigns is that it would also induce politicians (and workers) to focus
their attention on the needs and options for improving the situation of
ordinary workers on the job. Of course, the initial reaction of many
observers is that there is no real problem and need for reform. By contrast
to Charles Dickens' opening line in A Tale of Two Cities, these now seem
to be just "the best of times."
Certainly, inflation rates in the late 1990s were under 2% and
unemployment rates were under 5%, and the combination of the two were
at the lowest level since the late 1960s. An even better index of why the
media regularly celebrates the trends in the American economy is what has
been happening in the stock market. Whereas in the early 1970s, the Dow
Jones was under 1000, it is now over 10,000-a 1000% increase in a
quarter century. Certainly the 1990s were a wonderful time for someone in
the professional employment situation of a Harvard Law professor. Yet
when one delves beneath the surface of these stock index numbers, it
should become apparent why "middle American" workers are not so happy.
Certainly, these people find it easier to get jobs; but they also find it
essential to work more hours (often in more than one job) because they are
earning less in real dollars than they were twenty-five years ago. Consider
these key statistics:
(a) Median real family incomes went up more than 100% from
1947 to 1973, but since 1973 they have risen by only 10%-and
this during a period when real stock values rose nearly 300%.
(b) Worse yet is the data reflecting median earnings per hour
received by non-supervisory employees. In real dollars, these
earnings rose by more than 100% from 1947 to 1973 (and from
as far back as 1896, they doubled every thirty years). However,
these real median earnings have actually fallen since 1973, with
an even bigger drop for full-time male workers.
(c) The explanation for the disparity between a modest increase
in annual family income and an actual drop in individual hourly
earnings is that families are having to put in more hours on the
job in order to stay even with the economy. The average full-
time employee between twenty-five and fifty-four years of age
now works around 2,000 hours a year for the first time since the
late 1950s, up nearly 10% from the early 1980s (when it was only
1,840 hours a year).
Part of the explanation for these trends is a substantial decline in the
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rate of economic growth in the United States (notwithstanding the apparent
economic surge of the last five years). Per capita productivity has
increased an average of about 1% a year since 1973 (1.4% annually in the
1990s), in sharp contrast to the 3% annual growth rate in the "Golden Era"
following World War II. If there is less growth in real output per hour
worked, then there must be less real growth in absolute real earnings for the
people doing the work. However, a decline in the rate of productivity
growth will not explain the significant decline in absolute real pay for the
average worker. After all, even a 1% annual increase in per capita
productivity should permit roughly a 30% increase in real pay (after
compounding the productivity figures) during that same period. The true
explanation for the 7% drop in real pay stems from the fact that the
earnings of well-off workers have risen so sharply during that time.
To someone like myself, who for the last five years has been
concentrating his writings on the sports and entertainment worlds
(including their labor markets), especially vivid illustrations are the huge
salary records being set by not-so-big-name players as the National
Basketball Association's Kevin Garnett ($21 million a year for six years)
and Major League Baseball's Kevin Brown ($15 million a year for seven
years). Much the same visible change has also taken place in the
entertainment world. Tom Hanks, for example, has made about $50
million from Forest Gump and then from Saving Private Ryan. Not very
many ordinary Americans know, though, that the same phenomenon has
taken place with senior executives and financial talent. A good index is the
ratio of CEO earnings to those of the average employee. Whereas back in
1965 CEO's made twenty times the earnings of average workers, by 1997
this ratio had reached 116 to 1, a gap nearly six times larger than before.
Another study has found that, whereas back in 1974 the ratio of CEO pay
in the United States' Fortune 500 companies to average pay in the same
firm was about 40 to 1, by 1996 that disparity had reached 180 to 1.
From one perspective, CEO's and their top colleagues have clearly
earned these spiraling salaries, because they have been running the
companies whose profits and stock prices have been soaring during this
era. These corporate gains have not, however, come from generally
increasing economic productivity. As noted earlier, the aggregate rate of
growth has dropped substantially from its pace before the Dow Jones
spiraled. The key, instead, has been corporate reduction of its labor costs;
not just by containing real pay, but also by gradually reducing the coverage
of benefits such as health care and pension plans.'8 Over the last quarter
century, corporate profits as a share of national economic earnings have
18. By contrast, the 1947-73 era generated not only large gains in real take-home pay,
but even bigger expansion in medical, pension, and other fringe benefits.
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risen by about three percentage points, while labor compensation has
dropped by a corresponding amount. This is one key reason why the Dow
Jones stock index soared by 1000% during that period. In addition, the
heads of individual firms face not only strong pressure from these capital
markets to downsize their firms' labor costs, but they have a personal
incentive to do so as well, since a far larger share of executive pay now
comes from favorable options to buy their own company's stock.
IV. IMPROVING LEGAL AccEsS TO UNION REPRESENTATION
Whatever the explanation for the decline in economic productivity, a
clear factor in the huge rise in inequality within the American labor
market' 9 has been the decline in union representation. The following is
another sports law index that I discovered while writing Leveling the
Playing Field. Back in 1947, American workers had just embarked on full-
blown collective bargaining for their wages and benefits, with roughly 40%
of the private sector directly covered in this fashion, and a substantial spill-
over effect in related non-union jobs. One key exception, though, were
baseball players, who had just rejected independent unionization and
instead consented to a "company" union created by the team owners. At
that time, average baseball player salaries were approximately 4.5 times the
pay of the average American workers. Twenty years later (in 1967),
collective bargaining for employees generally had reduced the baseball-
ordinary worker ratio to 3.5 to 1. That was the year that baseball players
decided to install a real union official, Marvin Miller, as head of their
Association and embark on true collective bargaining. By that time,
though, overall union membership (and even more, the ratio of union
membership to the growing American labor force) had begun to slide, and
by the early 1970s, these union shares were dropping sharply. By the late
1990's, private sector union density was below 10% and still declining
everywhere except for sports and entertainment union members like Kevin
Brown and Tom Hanks. By 1997, the average baseball player was making
fifty-two times as much money on the job as the average American
worker.20
19. By inequality here, I am not referring to the usual preoccupation of liberals with
racial and sexual inequality, where the gap with white male workers has dropped
significantly over the last quarter century. My focus, instead, is the inequality between
ordinary workers (whether white male or black female) and corporate owners and/or
executives, where the gap has increased dramatically.
20. Some of those huge gains in major league salaries are attributable to rising league
revenues, most recently in the form of luxurious taxpayer-built stadiums. But a key index of
the difference that unionization has made in baseball is the fact that in the late 1960s the
payroll share of major league revenues was under 20%, while in the late 1990s it was over
60%. But during that same period, the pay of still non-union minor league players had been
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This sports example illustrates how the huge drop in union
representation of private sector employees has had some major economic
consequences. Relying simply on individual rather than collective
negotiating leverage in dealing with their employers has left average non-
union wages about 20% lower than they would otherwise be, and the
combination of wages and benefits is nearly 30% lower. But while this
feature of the current American workplace may be a social problem, it does
not necessarily justify a legal policy solution.
To my mind, the current representation gap is a problem from a
broader social perspective, for reasons articulated in the early 1990s by
(interestingly) a major figure in both Chicago labor economics and the
Republican party-George Schultz. Independent union representation, as
Schultz put it, serves as a valuable check and balance in the workings of the
labor market. Indeed, as Schultz explained, the ideal for each firm is to not
have a union in its own operations, but to have representation established in
its industry and in the economy as a whole. The good company that wants
to do the right thing for its employees, without having to bear the costs of
collective bargaining, can then feel economically comfortable about doing
that because it knows that the not-very-good companies, those who might
want to reap a profit premium by cutting their payrolls (via outsourcing,
downsizing, contingent employment, and other present-day techniques)
will face meaningful countervailing pressure from their employees acting
collectively to make the "bosses" do the right thing. The flip side of
Schultz's point is that the absence of such employee constraints on the
harsher employers places the better firms in a real financial/moral bind.
Indeed, this tension within the current labor market that flows out of
the decline in independent union representation has inflicted some legal
damage on the economy. As it has become more obvious that people
working for tougher employers do not have the private collective resources
to protect themselves, politicians, administrators, and judges have felt
compelled to step in and fill this gap with more and broader laws. The rise
of this new brand of government regulation under employment law, coupled
with the decline of free collective bargaining under labor law, has certainly
been beneficial for we law professors and our former law students.
However, for reasons I shall explain later, this trend has been a mixed
blessing for the general work force and an unhappy experience for the good
employers who must pay a sizable bill for this regulation and litigation.
Having spelled out these social costs, I have always believed (and
said) that the representation gap is not a public policy problem if no union
representation is what American workers really want.2' The fate of this
as flat in real terms as that of ordinary American workers.
21. By analogy, as a (recent) professor and writer in the area of Entertainment Law, I
have been stunned to learn that the average American watches television for 1600 hours per
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brand of workplace representation should be determined through
marketplace choice by consumers-here the workers themselves.
However, a key fact that was driven home to the President's
Commission was a national survey z that discovered a large, unsatisfied
demand among American workers for collective bargaining. There are
now roughly fifteen million non-union employees-nearly one-third of the
total in all but the tiny firms in the private sector-who would now like to
have union representation (and more than 90% of employees who now
have union representation said that they want to keep it.) Whatever the
admitted flaws of many present-day unions and their leaders, this vehicle
definitely offers workers a much better prospect than leaving their working
lives in the hands of a CEO whose pay soars while theirs is contained.
However, by contrast with other associations and their services
(including employment law firms), unionism is not perceived as a
realistically available option, even to those non-union workers who want it.
Whatever legal rights are promised to employees by section 7 of the
NLRA, workers are correct in what they told the Freeman-Rogers survey:
any effort on their part to engage in "self-organization" for purposes of
"collective bargaining" is going to be strongly opposed by their employers.
While 32% of currently non-union employers would vote for a union if
they could (and they said their co-workers would as well), 79% said that it
was very likely that employees who visibly sought such representation
would lose their jobs as a result, and 41% said they could lose their own
jobs with their current employers if they were seen to be involved in such a
campaign. The investigations done for the Commission of what was
actually happening in current campaigns demonstrate the tangible base for
this employee concern. Almost always, a union certification petition sets
off an intense, adversarial, and traumatic campaign, and at least one in four
of these campaigns produces the firing of a union supporter3
Why is it that so many employers feel free to violate this first-ever
year, listens to music (including radio) for 350 hours per year, but reads for just 120 hours
over the course of the entire year (and this number includes newspapers, magazines, and
books). This is another major transformation in American society since the early 1950s.
But while I would love to encourage more reading, I would never dream of advocating a law
that requires adults or youngsters to read more and watch television (or listen to music) less.
So also is the case with unions.
22. This research project was conducted by my Harvard colleague Richard Freeman, a
member of the Commission, in tandem with Joel Rogers. See RIcHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL
ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999).
23. And the latter is a conservative estimate of illegal employer reprisals against union
supporters. It does not include suspensions, denials of promotions, and other tangible
penalties. Even with respect to discharge, it includes only those discharges that produced an
unfair labor practice charge, an affirmative verdict or settlement, and reinstatement, rather
than just back pay for those pro-union employees who in fact were fired during the
campaign.
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federal anti-discrimination law? The reason is that the legal sanctions for
such illegal actions are so weak.
When Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935, most observers
believed that the Supreme Court would strike down the statute for
infringing the employer's constitutional-not just contractual-right to
terminate employees at will. While the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.24 did make "the constitutional switch in time that saved nine," it
accompanied this with very restricted readings regarding the scope of
remedies for discriminatory discharges. The employer's financial liability
was limited to just net, rather than gross, back pay lost by the fired union
supporter,25 and only after the latter had taken all reasonable steps
26necessary to find alternative work. The result is that by the 1990s the
median NLRB damage award against employers was less than $3,000
apiece (and even that amount is a tax-deductible corporate expense).
One possible justification for the minimal financial sanctions imposed
upon the anti-union employer is that the NLRB has always been authorized
to reinstate the fired employee. Certainly an immediate return to the
position where the employee had invested years of his or her working life is
the ideal form of affirmative action through which to minimize the
financial losses and personal dislocation suffered by the discharged worker.
And from the point of view of prevention strategy, returning a key union
supporter to the place where the illegal employer action took place, and at a
time when the employee organizing campaign was going on, would inflict
a major setback on the employer in his struggle with the union. This
employee's reappearance on the job would visibly display to his colleagues
both the need for and potential value of a mechanism to challenge the
absolute authority of management through group action under labor law.
The reality, though, is that the current combination of a three-stage
NLRB administrative process and the need for circuit court endorsement of
the board verdict means that the employer does not face a legally-
enforceable reinstatement order until 1000 days or more after the original
firing. And even if the employer is prepared to settle earlier (if only to
avoid its expanding legal bills), this almost invariably takes place after the
pro-union employees have lost their organizing campaign. By that time,
only one in three of the reinstated employees will exercise their right to
return to work with the firm that fired them, and of those who do return,
four out of five will feel compelled by management to leave that job within
a year.
On its face, a simple and fair mode of labor law reform would be to
give workers fired for supporting the cause of unionization the same right
24. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
25. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
26. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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to sue the employer for at-large damages in court as Title VII claimants and
other victims of actionable discrimination. As noted above, it was the
enactment of the NLRA that produced the constitutional precedent that
permitted legal bans on all forms of employer discrimination. By the
1990s, it was not unheard of for a woman who was forced out of her job
due to sexual harassment to secure jury verdicts of $5 million or more.
When one adds the possibility of hundreds of millions of dollars paid in
class action suits for systematic discrimination, this legal prospect provides
employers with a very strong incentive not to violate these rights. If a
black woman has been fired for leading a union organizing effort amongst
her fellow employees, she would seem morally entitled to the same kind of
legal relief and employer sanction.27
However, if we have to choose only a single reform of labor law here,
my own preference has always been to drastically enhance the speed, and
thence the effectiveness, of the reinstatement remedy. The simple solution,
endorsed by the President's Commission, would be to provide immediate
injunctive relief for the victims of such firings in the midst of a
representation campaign. That would simply give employees one key part
of the legal protection that Congress gave employers back in 1947 when it
enacted section 10(1) of the NLRA to protect firms from "secondary
boycotts" by unions (then used principally in organizing campaigns).28
Any country that believes in fair treatment of both sides of the employment
relationship should give employee-victims of illegal organizational firings
by their employers the same immediate injunctive relief now effectively
used by employers to block illegal organizational (and other) boycotts
mounted by unions. And the reason for my preference for injunctive rather
than monetary relief (if I have to make that choice) is, as noted earlier, that
reinstating the illegally fired worker to his job while the representation
campaign is still going on is the best way to restore and preserve the
feelings among fellow employees that they do have a real legal right to
organize themselves into a union for purposes of enhancing their own
situation on the job.
Even more important than trying quickly to undo the harm after it has
been done is reshaping the legal environment to reduce the opportunity and
incentive to inflict the illegal harm in the first place. In the union
representation context, the most crucial feature of labor law reform is
27. Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that already-unionized workers who have been
fired for asserting their right to workers compensation can sue in court for general and
unrestricted damages for wrongful dismissal in violation of public policy. See Lingle v.
Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
28. I should note that not only do employees have the right to section 10(1) injunctions
against unions, but they also have the right (under section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act) to sue in court for any damages that the union may have inflicted in the
interim.
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replacing protracted with promptly-held elections. The way to do this is to
tell unions that in order to be certified as a bargaining agent, they must sign
up more than a majority (e.g., 55% or 60%) of the affected employees.
When the union has provided those clearly-written and signed
representation forms, the Board should conduct the election within the next
week or two. That kind of election still gives the affected employees 9 a
real opportunity for second thoughts on this issue, with the benefit of
secrecy in the voting booth. And if the union wins the vote, it receives the
further mandate and legitimacy generated by an election rather than just a
sign-up campaign. At the same time, the promptness of this election
sharply reduces the opportunity for unscrupulous employers to single out
one or two key union supporters for firing or other reprisals-not just to
remove them from the voter's list, but to send the message to other
employees about how their jobs are also at risk (something that American
workers now strongly believe to be the case).
The major counter-argument made by employers-especially the
majority who do not engage in this most egregious breaking of labor law
tradition-is that they are denied what should be their equal right to
campaign for the allegiance of employee voters. This is said to be the
equivalent of a political election that allows the Democratic party, but not
the Republicans, to campaign effectively for voter support in political
elections.
The fallacy in that analogy and argument is that it mistakenly assumes
that an affirmative vote for the union or an NLRB election means that the
union is now governing employers (or even employees). All that a
successful employee verdict does is give the union the mandate to
represent employees in negotiations with the employer under labor law.
Under employment law, we would never dream of suggesting that the
employer should have an affirmative right and opportunity to campaign
against the employee's decision about whether to hire a law firm (and if so,
which one) when challenging employer policies regarding occupational
safety or sexual harassment, for example. Nor would one suggest that
under corporate law, employees should have the same full-blown rights as
shareholders to campaign and/or vote about proposed corporate mergers
and "down-sizing" policies designed to enhance company earnings and
stock prices. It is time for American labor law to recognize that employees
alone are the constituency that should be involved in the judgment about
whether they need union representation to persuade corporate management
29. If there are issues raised regarding the inclusion or exclusion of certain employees
from the unit (e.g., individual managers or groups of clerical employees), judgments
concerning these employees would be made after the vote had been held, with the contested
ballots sealed and opened up only if they needed to be counted and after the Board had
heard and ruled upon the legal issues regarding their unit status.
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to enhance their pay and working conditions.
V. DEREGULATING ESTABLISHED BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS
One possible objection that employers could make to that last claim is
that labor law jurisprudence, fashioned by the Supreme Court, does impose
some significant constraints on employer personnel prerogatives once the
employees have voted to be represented by a union. Indeed, I do agree that
a fully principled approach to labor law reform, one that acknowledges the
statute's supposed commitment to free and flexible negotiations at a more
equal bargaining table, would also relax the obligations that certification
now imposes on the employer.
When the Wagner Act was first enacted in 1935, then-Senate Labor
Committee Chairman Walsh said, in effect, that when employees vote in
favor of union representation, the job of the law and the NLRB is to escort
the union representative to the doors of the employer, but not to get
involved with what is happening behind those doors. However, beginning
in the 1950s, the Supreme Court read the employer's duty to bargain in
good faith as containing not just a genuine willingness to reach and sign an
agreement with the employees' union, but also some requirements and
limits on what the employer could do on the way there.
One such doctrine evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,3° in which the Court directed an
employer to provide the union with all information that was arguably
relevant to its negotiation of a new contract or administration of the old
one. A second such ruling was NLRB v. Katz,31 which barred an employer
from making any unilateral changes in existing employment conditions
without securing consent from, or negotiating to an impasse with, the
union. These doctrines have, in turn, led to a large number of subsequent
cases tackling the following issues: what amounts to a mandatory, as
opposed to a permissive, subject of bargaining; when is the information
sought by the union relevant to any such mandatory term (and how much
countervailing weight should be given to the employer's need for
confidentiality); and, most difficult of all, has an impasse-i.e., a
deadlock-actually been reached at the bargaining table?
3 2
30. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
31. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
32. One of the most visible illustrations of these legal consequences is what took place
in Major League Baseball in 1994 and 1995. In June 1994, team owners presented to the
players union their demand and plan for a hard salary cap. In August 1994, the players went
on strike. In September 1994, the owners called off the World Series. In October 1994,
President Clinton asked a special mediator to attempt to bring the parties to an agreement.
In December 1994, with no settlement yet reached, and the winter season of individual free
agency negotiations about to begin, the owners imposed their salary cap on these
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In my earlier life as a Labor Board Chairman in my native Canada, I
had written a number of decisions that refused to follow that American
judicial line.33 In particular, in a major British Columbia forest products
labor dispute, I read the law as saying that as long as an employer was
genuinely prepared to negotiate with a union a contract which covered
some conditions of employment, that employer should be under no legal
obligation even to discuss any one particular topic, let alone have to
provide detailed information about, and/or refrain from unilateral action
relating to, these issues, unless and until management could persuade the
Labor Board that further negotiations had proven fruitless.34 The incentives
for employers (or unions) to take or refrain from any such action should be
provided by the parties at the other side of the bargaining table, rather than
their own labor lawyers. Needless to say, I would like to see Congressional
reform of American labor law follow that Canadian model and roll back the
current elaborate body of good-faith bargaining law to restore the principle
that collective bargaining is supposed to befree.
There is an analogous, though more complicated issue, in which the
Supreme Court itself could (and should) remove a constraint it has imposed
on what the parties can jointly agree to at the bargaining table. I am
referring here to the ruling in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 3' There
the Court held that, even though a union member had available (indeed,
had used) the grievance arbitration system negotiated by his union with the
employer to challenge any discharge or discipline, he could not thereby be
precluded from suing the employer in court for allegedly firing him in
breach of the Civil Rights Act. The Court believed that there could be "no
prospective waiver" of an employees' rights under Title VII.36 However,
negotiations. In February 1995, the NLRB's General Counsel told the owners that their
action was illegal because an "impasse" had not yet been reached. The owners, feeling
compelled to accept that ruling because of the potential cost if they lost, substituted league,
rather than individual team, negotiations with players, and also abolished salary arbitration.
Those radical changes in the labor-relationship were said to be permissive rather than
mandatory, thus requiring no negotiations at all. On April 1, 1995, the judge (using section
100)) told the owners that they had misread labor law on this case as well. Happily, that
judicial ruling helped produce a 1995 season using true major league players, rather than
strike replacement players that the owners had brought to spring training. It did, however,
impose a significant and unfair legal constraint on the owner-employers in their subsequent
negotiations and settlement with the players' union for an extremely soft tax.
33. Indeed, as a student of American labor law, I have always been impressed by the
position of Justice Harlan in his dissent in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342 (1958), to the effect that "the bargaining process should be left fluid, free from
intervention of the Board .. " Id. at 358-359.
34. See Pulp & Paper Indus. Relations Bureau v. Canada Paper Workers Union [1978]
1 Canadian Lab. Rel. Rep. 60.
35. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
36. Id. at5l.
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seventeen years later, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. , 7 the
Court held that individual non-union employees could waive their right to
go to court instead of arbitration (under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act), even though that had been made a condition of
employment by a group of employers acting collectively (through the New
York Stock Exchange). There is now a debate going on within the circuit
courts about the intended and current scope of both Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer.38 However, to the extent these specific holdings are applied more
generally (as they regularly have been), the Court's basic principles are
wrong in both situations, and there is a better way the Court can approach
each of them.
As noted earlier, the decline in employee representation under labor
law over the last three decades has coincided with a huge surge in
employee litigation under both new employment statutes and the common
law. Indeed, since the early 1970s the number of employment suits has
risen much faster than even tort suits in federal courts: employment
litigation is up 800% from what it was in 1971, and now makes up around
20% of the total federal docket. Even on the personal injury side, workers
compensation total annual expenditures ($60-65 billion) dwarf the amount
now spent on products liability ($20-25 billion) or medical malpractice ($7-
8 billion).
Immediate popular and judicial attention focuses on the few cases that
actually go to court, especially those producing a verdict for the "sad
victim" of maltreatment and injury at the hands of the "bad boss."
However, in assessing the broader values of employment litigation and its
alternatives, it is crucial to be conscious not just of the costs of the system,
but also of the ratio of costs to benefits, and especially who actually bears
those costs as well as receives the benefits.
37. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
38. The most recent ruling is Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70
(1998), in which the Court held that even if Gilmer were eventually to override Gardner-
Denver, the general arbitration clause wording was not sufficient to operate as a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver by the union of the unit members' right to a "judicial forum" (under
the Americans With Disabilities Act). In the non-union context, the most recent decisions
are Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), in which the
circuit panel found that mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of non-union
employment are now precluded by the 1991 Civil Rights Act revisions to Title VII (as
opposed to the ADEA which was at issue in Gilmer), and Koveleskie v. SBC Capital
Markets, hIc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999), which rejected the Duffield court's reading of
the 1991 Act. And in Fall 2000, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the appeal of a per
curiam decision by a Ninth Circuit panel, Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 1999), which had ruled that the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not give the
employer the right to enforce in federal courts an arbitration provision that had been made a
condition of employment in any industry that is part of the interstate commerce over which
Congress now has constitutional authority.
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Based on my research about personal injury, as well as employment
litigation, these are the basic facts we should be aware of in appraising the
current regime:
(a) The amount of dollars spent on litigation (by both plaintiffs
and defendants) is roughly twice the net amount that ends up in
the pockets of victims.
(b) The costs incurred by companies (in terms of time, effort, and
expenses) to comply with more and more detailed employment
regulations are several times the cost of litigation and insurance
when companies are sued.
(c) A substantial share of these aggregate costs are initially paid
for by the good employers-both the compliance costs to reduce
the risk of suit and the litigation costs to defend what often are
spurious suits.
(d) However, the burden of these employer expenditures is then
largely passed on to employees. Employers in a competitive
marketplace face limits as to what they can spend in terms of
aggregate labor costs; thus, if some of the costs are mandated by
government (e.g., workers' compensation premiums), others must
be reduced-in particular, the wages and benefits that are not
legally mandated. What this means is that the employees of good
employers actually pick up much of the bill of government
mandates designed to protect employees from the actions of not-
so-good employers.
(e) The benefits are also unevenly distributed amongst
employees. Indeed, almost all of the lawsuits (more than nine of
ten) are filed by workers who never were, or no longer are, on the
job in question-something that is quite understandable since it is
difficult to keep working for a "boss" whom one is suing in court.
In addition, those employees who were dismissed for arguably
inappropriate reasons are likely the marginal members of that
category (e.g., of age), who thus need to draw upon the help of
the law to get the fair treatment that their pure talent cannot
assure them.
(f) With respect to anti-discrimination law, in particular, none of
those benefits go to young, able-bodied, white males, which may
explain some of their current political disenchantment. However,
even amongst the protected legal categories, the bulk of
successful suits are filed by older, upper-level,
managerial/professional employees, not those in the lower-
echelon jobs in which mostly women and minorities work. The
fact that the average cost to plaintiffs of litigating an employment
case is approximately $60,000 is the reason why only about 10%
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of the people who get a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC can
actually find a lawyer willing to file suit on their behalf.
Obviously, a crucial factor in the lawyer's judgment about
whether it is worthwhile to take and press a case to the finish is
how much in the way of damages will be paid if the case wins-
and that number turns principally on how much the employee
was making before he or she was fired from (or felt forced to
quit) the job.
There is, then, a much more complicated distribution of the benefits
and burdens of employment litigation and regulation than the standard
"good worker versus bad employer" rhetoric in the general debates. That
perspective does not lead me to call for repealing or rolling back the basic
laws that attempt to fashion a fairer and safer workplace for those who need
it.39 It has, however, persuaded me of the virtues of major changes in the
administration of employment law, through private arbitration of
employees' statutory claims.
As a matter of general principle, employees should be free to negotiate
with the employee-elected union a term in their collective agreement that
makes their jointly-created arbitration system the exclusive vehicle for
administering legal as well as contractual rights on the job. That freedom
must, however, be subject to the following conditions to ensure effective
access to, and enforcement of, the public policies in question:
(a) The individual employee must have the right to pursue the
claim to arbitration free of settlements agreed-to just by the
employer and the union (and subject only to the latter's duty of
fair representation).
(b) The employee must also have the right to use his or her own
lawyer to present the case (with the union presenting its position
as well).
(c) The employee and his or her counsel must have full access to
any information about the case generated through the grievance
procedure.
(d) The arbitrator is authorized to award whatever remedies are
made available by the statute, even if these are not provided for
pure contract claims.
(e) The employee (as well as the employer) should be able to
seek judicial review of the arbitrator's reading of the general law
39. I would, however, restore the employer's freedom to terminate employees at the age
of seventy by removing the recent ADEA bar, whose principal benefits accrue to well-off
white males like me with a tenured professorship at Harvard Law School.
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in question.40
Wherever these public enforcement standards have been complied
with, Gardner-Denver must be distinguished so as to accommodate the
benefits that a jointly-created and readily-accessible labor arbitration
process can bestow on American workers who are supposed to be the
beneficiaries of the substantive employment laws.
At the same time, the apparent freedom offered by the Court in Gilmer
to non-union employers to unilaterally create their own arbitration systems
and insist upon these as conditions of employment must be revised to
ensure that all of the above standards, and several more, have been met.
Other key conditions would include allowing the affected employee (not
just the employer) an equal voice in deciding who is to be the arbitrator,
and providing that employee with some pre-hearing right of access to
documents and discovery of witnesses (analogous to those that union
members now secure through grievance procedures). President Clinton's
Commission was prepared to accept my recommendation that this set of
quality standards should be the benchmark for the legal enforceability of
employee agreements to substitute arbitration for litigation of civil rights,
wrongful dismissal, and other employment law complaints. However,
accepting the views of civil rights and labor groups, the Commission
members came down strongly against permitting such enforceable
contracts to be made before the dispute had arisen, and certainly not as a
condition of employment when being hired. Needless to say, I believe that
adopting only half of my position was a mistake.
The policy problem in allowing arbitration agreements to be entered
into only after a dispute has arisen is that there will be a strong disincentive
to reaching such an agreement. When the employer's lawyer and the
employee's lawyer are both looking at the facts of the same dispute, the
reasons why one side will say this is a better case for arbitration than a trial
are the very reasons why the other side will say "Show me thejury!" Faced
with the prospect of such ex post adverse selection of the arbitrable cases
by plaintiffs who, at this point, are almost all former employees, employers
will have little up-front incentive to develop and administer such a post-
dispute program.
40. In other words, the courts must apply the standard of W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) to ensure that the arbitral reading of the contract language,
not just the language itself, does not conflict with "explicit public policy," rather than the
huge judicial deference afforded by the Steelworkers Trilogy to the privately-selected
arbitrator's reading of privately-negotiated contract language. The Steelworkers Trilogy was
comprised of three separate arbitrations. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
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That failure will impose a bigger cost on employees than on
employers. The historical experience with grievance arbitration in labor
agreements has demonstrated the huge benefits that quality ADR systems
can confer on ordinary workers. For those employees who run into a
problem (e.g., sexual harassment) in their workplace, legal justice would
become more, not less, accessible. Not only is arbitration cheaper and
faster relief, but current, not just former, employees can regularly use it.
As noted earlier, workers are understandably leery about both suing and
staying on their jobs. But as experience with grievance arbitration shows,
employees feel much more comfortable about seeking to resolve an
immediate problem in the employer's private ADR system, while
preserving their own personal investment in a career with that firm. And
even with respect to employees who do not themselves have a legal
problem, the total costs to their employers of arbitration are much lower
than litigation in American courts. This means that employers will have
more money in their labor cost budget to spend on take-home pay, rather
than on this statutorily-imposed and judicially-enforced benefit package.
Thus, replacing costly and erratic public litigation with high-quality,
private arbitration can enhance the legal and economic situation of workers
as much as that of employers. Certainly, the Supreme Court should
recognize this fact in re-working Gardner-Denver to enhance freedom of
contract in the collective bargaining setting.
VI. FREEING UP NON-UNION EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT
Employer-created alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") plans do
pose some legitimate questions as to the effective enforcement of public
employment law by and for non-union employees. Those questions are,
however, best addressed by permitting fair ADR plans, rather than by
barring all such plans from being made a condition of employment.
Employer-created Employee Involvement Plans ("EIPs") are even more
legally questionable under current labor law, but with much less
justification for continuance of that law into this new century.
Adoption of the brand of serious labor law reforms presented earlier-
instant injunctions and instant elections-would make a substantial
contribution to closing the current representation gap. Recall that fifteen
million currently non-union workers would like to have independent union
representation to try to improve their relative situation in our present-day
economy of soaring stock values and stagnant real pay and benefits.
However, the Commission-sponsored Freeman-Rogers survey of worker
views found that the United States actually has a far larger participation
gap. Approximately fifty million American employees (many of them
union members) would like to have more voice in what is happening in
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their day-to-day working lives.
This is not just a matter of what employees would like to experience
and enjoy. There can be real economic gains from more cooperative
employer-employee relationships, in which management gives employees a
real say in their jobs. Employers (and the economy) can derive large
benefits from employee insights and commitment to more efficient
production of higher quality goods and services; and this at the same time
as employees (and the society) are experiencing real involvement in, and
influence upon, the quality of working lives. However, a key message I
have derived from my scholarly colleagues in human resources
management (e.g., M.I.T.'s Tom Kochan, who was also on the
Commission) is that innovations such as work teams, worker-management
committees, and the like will have a meaningful and enduring impact on
production quality only if the employees involved see that the firm's
program has a reciprocal focus on their concerns, as well as those of the
firm's customers and shareholders.
Unfortunately, there is a major obstacle in present-day American labor
law to such reciprocal treatment. In Electromation, Inc.,41 the wording of
the original NLRA ban on "company unionism" was definitively
interpreted by the Bush Administration's Labor Board as barring such
human resource practices. 42 It is illegal for a company alone to fashion an
"employee representation committee" that "deals with" the employer about
the employee's "working conditions." That means that a non-union firm
can establish and administer an employee involvement program that
focuses just on the employer's productivity problems, but not on the
employees' concerns about job safety, fair discipline, benefit
administration, and the like.
An example that really drove this legal message home to me during
the Commission proceedings involved Polaroid-a company based close to
where I live and work in Cambridge. Polaroid's founder, M.I.T. Professor
Dr. Land, was a pioneer in human resources, as well as technological
innovation. Back in the late 1940s, Land not only invented instant
photography, he also developed a system of full-blown employee
democracy in his workplace. Every Polaroid employee, from the CEO
down to the janitor, had a secret ballot vote to elect the board members who
addressed a broad array of employee concerns. In the early 1990s, though,
this system generated a legal complaint concerning who actually had been
41. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
42. As both the Board and Seventh Circuit opinions made clear, this seemed to be the
necessary reading of the actual language of section 8(a)(2) and its earlier interpretations by
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241
(1939), and NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
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elected.43 When this non-section 8(a)(2) case came across the desks of
Polaroid's labor lawyers in Boston (who had just read Electromation), they
had to tell their client the bad news. This version of workplace democracy
was illegal under American labor laws and had to be dismantled.
I have always been somewhat skeptical about the benefits of this
American ban on "company unionism."44 I recognize, though, that just as
employers have done regarding expedited injunctions and union elections,
unions and their supporters have also made a plausible argument for the
preservation of section 8(a)(2)-the dangers of conflict of interest.
Certainly we would all consider it to be a serious breach of professional
ethics if the company were to hire and provide the lawyers who represent
employees even in settling-let alone litigating or arbitrating-an
employment lawsuit against the firm. An analogous conflict of interest is
felt to exist where the employer creates and administers an employee
representation system45 that deals-not just bargains-with the employer
about "conditions of work."
In addition to unions, American workers feel somewhat the same
concern. Indeed, the Freeman-Rogers survey which discovered the huge
and unsatisfied worker demand for employee participation on the job also
found that more than 90% of workers polled said they want the employees,
not the managers, to select the people who will be their representatives on
the committee. Although no similar survey was done on the other side, my
own impression is that just as high a percentage of employers want it done
in the opposite fashion. Management feels it must have the prerogative to
select many, if not all, of the employee-members of a committee that the
company has created. Polaroid's Dr. Land was very much the exception
rather than the rule of the American business tradition.
However, the fact that many firms are inclined to create the kind of
employee involvement plan that most workers find rather spurious is no
reason for preserving a sixty-five-year old blanket ban on what a company
like Polaroid did do. Indeed, however broad its wording and interpretation,
section 8(a)(2) is in fact enforced only sporadically and erratically, usually
when another legal dispute has arisen and thence displayed the apparently
43. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding
Report, May 1994, at 42, 60.
44. I must acknowledge that these personal views have been shaped to some extent by
my Canadian background. At the same time that Canadian labor law has offered interested
employees immediate access to union representation (often just through membership card
checks rather than prompt elections), it has also permitted employers to create a broad array
of EIPs. The only restraint is that the employer must not fashion a true company union that
collectively bargains, rather than just deals, with the employer regarding terms of
employment.
45. Including, as in Electromation, picking the employee-representatives.
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illegal company practice.46 The right way for American workers to get
their wishes satisfied is through an improved labor law marketplace in
which employees can express their own majority preferences as between
alternative forms of representation (i.e., between committees created and
controlled by employers or unions created and controlled by workers).
While I was unsuccessful in persuading President Clinton's
Commission to endorse them, I do want to reiterate my scholarly views on
this score. We should roll back section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA so that it bans
only company-dominated unions that collectively bargain-not just deal-
with the employer.47 However, as I also tried unsuccessfully to persuade
the Gingrich Congress regarding its Teamwork for Employees and
Managers Act ("TEAM") effort, reforming just this one branch of labor law
that employers now object to is equally inappropriate. Employers should
be free to fashion employee representation plans they think would make
their firm more effective and attractive in the current labor market.
However, they should be given that freedom only as part of broader labor
law reform that makes independent union representation readily accessible
to the fifteen million American workers who now want it, but rightly feel
intimidated about trying for it.48 That kind of fairer, as well as freer, labor
market would serve as the best check and balance against "spurious"
unionism being imposed on employees by management. And removing the
blanket regulation of section 8(a)(2) would no longer block innovative
efforts by Polaroid's Dr. Land that have provided valuable human resources
lessons for unionized, as well as non-unionized, firms.
46. Not just in Polaroid, but also in Electromation, the unfair labor practice charge was
filed only after the Teamsters were looking to find a basis for overturning a protracted anti-
union election campaign that had been run by that employer.
47. I should note that, if the employer were to create an EIP during the midst of a union
organizing campaign to try to woo the employees back to its side in this score, that action
would not be illegal under section 8(a)(2) and Electromation, but would be illegal under
section 8(a)(1) and NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964), which bans any kind
of employer-awarded benefits designed to best the union in the upcoming election.
48. One thing that the TEAM Act proponents refused to incorporate into the bill was a
response to the way that EIPs would expand the scope of the statutory exclusion of
'supervisors" (especially as read by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994)), as well as a response to the Court's own creation of
an exclusion of non-supervisory "managers" from any labor law rights, see NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), even if any such "managerial" influence on the firm's
operations is conducted in a collective rather than individual fashion (like the faculty Senate
in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980)). This is just another of the Court-
developed limits and restraints on union representation and collective bargaining that
Congress must start to rethink and revise as we move into the 21st Century.
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VII. A REAL RIGHT TO STRIKE
The bottom-line test of the legitimacy of comprehensive labor law
reform is whether it tackles features of the current labor system that both
unions and employers might like to preserve, but whose replacement serves
the interests of workers. The last and most important such issue-though
one that President Clinton left off of the agenda of his Commission-
relates to the employees' right to strike to improve their situation on the job.
Just as we saw with EIPs, there is a major difference between
American and Canadian labor law on this score-though this difference
was created by the worst contribution that the U.S. Supreme Court has
made to the current shape of labor law in this country. In the original 1935
NLRA, Congress conferred on employees the affirmative right not just to
organize themselves into a union and bargain collectively with their
employer, but also (if necessary) to engage in "concerted" action-i.e., to
strike-to try to move the employer's position at the bargaining table. The
law explicitly barred the employer from discharging or otherwise
retaliating against its employees for exercising this and other statutory
rights. But just three years later (at a time when the constitutionality of the
Wagner Act was still somewhat in doubt), the Court made a casual and
unnecessary comment in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.49 that
while employers could not discharge their striking employees, they could
permanently replace them. Sixty years later, this Mackay Radio dictum
remains firmly entrenched in American labor law.
Mackay Radio is actually the source of the one tangible value of the
elaborate jurisprudence regarding "good faith" bargaining. The sole
exception the Supreme Court has been prepared to carve out of the
employer's prerogative to permanently replace its striking employees is
whether the work stoppage was initiated or prolonged by bad faith
bargaining on the part of the employer.50 Only if Congress is finally ready
to roll back Mackay Radio under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA
should the same action be taken towards Katz, Truitt, and other expansions
of section 8(a)(5).
From the employee's perspective, there would seem to be little
tangible difference between being discharged for striking or being
permanently replaced in one's job.5' Certainly under other federal
49. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
50. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
51. Indeed, it took thirty years for the Court to recognize any difference. Whereas
under Mackay Radio an employee who was permanently replaced during the strike had no
right to return to work even if a vacancy later opened up, NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,
389 U.S. 375 (1967) finally gave the legal striker priority rights among applicants for new
positions if they became available before the strikers had themselves found permanent
positions elsewhere.
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statutes-e.g., the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which gives
employees the right to unpaid leaves during childbirth and other medical
needs-the Court would never dream of ruling that the employee
exercising that right could not be discharged, but could be permanently
(rather than just temporarily) replaced. And it would seem considerably
easier for an individual woman leaving her current job to give birth to a
child to find another job somewhere else than it would for a sizeable group
of women who all left their jobs together to go on strike and eventually
have to look for new jobs when they were permanently replaced for that
reason.
Within the labor relations context, this permanent replacement
prerogative gives employers a major, but by no means an essential, weapon
to use in their battles with their employees. Even if the employee work
stoppage does effectively shut down the company's operations, it operates
as a double-edged sword for the strikers. The employees are also left
without work and pay, with financial consequences for their families that
almost always are much more than the economic costs inflicted on the
company's shareholders, let alone its still-paid executives on the other side
of the table. 2 In any event, employers can and should be free to operate
during the strike, hiring temporary replacements for that purpose. As the
National Football League owners demonstrated during the 1987 players
strike (recently replayed in the Hollywood movie, The Replacements), such
an employer measure largely insulates the employer from union pressure,
and eventually forces the employees to give up and return to work on the
employer's terms.
Twenty-seven years after Mackay Radio, the Supreme Court ruled that
employers were entitled to initiate a lockout on employees in order to place
the same economic pressure on employees to concede at the bargaining
table.53 Up to this point, the Reagan Board54 and the circuit courts5 have
(appropriately) permitted employers to use only temporary, rather than
permanent, replacements during the lockout work stoppage. The
demonstrated ability of many employers to recruit temporary replacements
in both strikes and lockouts provides tangible evidence that offering
permanent status is not crucial to employers seeking to bring in
replacements in our ever-increasingly "contingent" work force. Indeed, the
combination of both bad faith bargaining law (e.g., in Mastro Plastics) and
52. Certainly that is true when the employer is a large conglomerate that has only part
of its operations closed down.
53. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
54. See Harter Equip., Inc. v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 280
N.L.R.B. 597 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 88 v. NLRB (National Gypsum Co.),
858 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
PRINCIPLED RESHAPING OF LABOR LAW
economic bargaining with the union means that the employer cannot
actually guarantee the replacements a permanent claim to these jobs. That
is why the Supreme Court advised employers that in order to insulate
themselves from any contract suits by the replacements, the kind of
"permanent" priority that should be offered to these "at will" replacement
employees is contingent on the strikers not being able to get their jobs back
via an unfair labor practice charge or negotiated labor settlement.56
Read in this fashion, the Supreme Court's jurisprudential "refinement"
of Mackay Radio is designed simply to give employers total freedom of
choice about whether to permanently or temporarily replace their striking
employees. Employers, in fact, use just the temporary replacement option
when they hire someone to replace the higher-quality, higher-paid union
members-e.g., a John Elway and Dan Marino during the 1987 NFL
players strike-and they use the permanent replacement option to rid
themselves of the ordinary American workers who have sought to use
concerted action to protest their often underpaid situation. While this
might seem to be yet another legal contribution to the economic inequality
noted earlier, the Supreme Court might respond by saying that collective
bargaining is supposed to be free of outside legal regulation, even when
employees choose to "gamble" by striking.57
The fact is, though, that current labor law (again, largely as
constructed by the Supreme Court) places some major constraints upon
what union members can do while on strike, thereby substantially reducing
the "gamble" that employers take when economically battling with their
employees. First, while any strike has to be a collective effort by affected
employees committed to a joint cause, unions are precluded from imposing
any meaningful sanctions on employees who cross over the line. As seen
earlier, in General Motors the Court reworded section 8(a)(3) to prohibit
any voluntary agreements between unions and employers that require
employees to become members of the union and thence make the
commitment to fellow members that they will go out and stay out on a
strike approved by the group. Then, in Pattern Makers' League of North
America v. NLRB,5s the Court upheld the Reagan Board's reading of
General Motors as implying that even if employees voluntarily choose to
join the union and make that commitment, when they want to cross over
their colleagues' picket line, they can simply resign from the union and
thence insulate themselves from any sanctions. (That is what players like
56. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
57. Characterizing the "right" to strike as a "gamble" is the term used by Justice
O'Connor in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426, 438 (1989), when the Court chose to extend its Mackay Radio dictum about the
NLRA to the RLA.
58. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
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Joe Montana, Tony Dorsett, and others did during the 1987 NFL strike.)
And workers can take that action aware that they remain fully entitled to all
of the employment benefits that their fellow unit members are able to
secure from the employer. The only such contractual restraints on
employee section 7 rights that the Court has held enforceable are union-
employer agreements that the employees will not strike.59
Suppose, though, that the employees who remain committed to their
common cause and strike action seek the support of fellow union members
and sympathizers by asking them not to handle or use the product made by
replacements or "crossovers." Here the Court has created another distorted
brand of labor jurisprudence, whose bottom-line effect is again a reduction
in worker leverage at the bargaining table.
True, if the employees picket at the stores where the product is being
sold, they can ask customers not to buy this struck product (though not to
refrain from buying anything else in that store). This NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits)60 reading of the very vague
Congressional wording of section 8(b)(4) draws the proper distinction
between primary and secondary consumer boycott efforts.
However the much more effective lever that employees can use to
reduce the value of the struck product for the employer and its
replacements would be to ask fellow workers in the store (as opposed to
customers) not to unload the product, place it on the shelves, or sell it to
customers choosing to ignore the strikers' appeal in front of the store. In
59. And not only has the Court readily (and legitimately) concluded that the latter
restraints are fully compatible with section 7, but the Court has also read into the 1932
Norris-LaGuardia Act an exemption of these agreements from that Act's apparent blanket
ban on federal court injunctions against any kind of strike. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), in which Justice Brennan authored the
opinion reversing Justice Black's contrary verdict just eight years earlier in Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). That judicial reform of 1930s labor legislation
removed, of course, any felt need of employers to seek, rather than block, labor law reform
from Congress later in the 1970s-legislative action that would have responded to the
legitimate needs of workers as well as employers.
60. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
61. Unfortunately, in two later cases the Court ignored this rational line even in the
consumer setting. In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title
Insurance Co.), 447 U.S. 607 (1980), the Court said that if struck products constitute the
principal product sold in the store, then this turns the union's efforts into a boycott of the
secondary store rather than the primary employer (and notwithstanding the fact that the
employer was principal owner of the store). By contrast, in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), the
Court ruled that if the union used a leaflet rather than a picket, not only could it ask the
customers to boycott the entire store where the struck product was just one of the items
being sold, but the union could also ask its supporters not to go into any one of the many
independent and totally-uninvolved stores in that same shopping mall. A rational legal
approach would reverse both Safeco and DeBartolo.
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Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. NLRB (Sand
62Door), though, the Court ruled that any such strike effort (whether
through pickets, handbills, or just verbal requests) is an illegal secondary
boycott even though targeted just at the struck product (which the
secondary firm would not have had any access to if the primary employer
had not chosen and been able to replace the strikers). And in 1959 the
Congress (via section 8(e)) closed up the one possible loophole in Sand
Door when it barred secondary employers and their unions from
voluntarily agreeing not to handle struck products (i.e., "hot cargo").
If American labor law was truly committed to the principle of
economic freedom in the bargaining process, it would have reached the
opposite results in General Motors, Pattern Makers, and Sand Door (just as
in Katz and Truitt, for reasons noted earlier). What I advocate, though, is
the more moderate labor law reform of overturning Mackay Radio instead
(something that nearly came to pass in the Workplace Fairness Act of 1993,
until a minority group of Senators blocked it from coming to a final vote).
Employers should be free to use just temporary replacements of striking, as
well as locked-out, employees. American workers would then finally enjoy
the same meaningful right to strike without being pennanently replaced in
their jobs as they now have with their FMLA right to leave work to care for
a sick child, for example. Indeed, I would follow the FMLA model further,
and state that this right to be on strike, free of permanent replacement,
should have a time limit-whether the twelve months of the FMLA or
perhaps only the six months in the original Ontario labor law in this area.
VIII. THE RIGHT PATH TOWARDS TRUE REFORM
I would suggest that Congress add this further legal feature to union
strike action. Workers should become entitled to protection from
permanent replacement when they go on a legal strike, because the union
should be permitted to call such a strike only with secret ballot majority
approval by the affected members. Certainly this condition would add to
the political appeal of rolling back Mackay Radio. From a policy
perspective, though, it would also ensure that union members, not just
union leaders, have focused on whether the immediate pay checks they are
giving up (even though they are no longer "gambling" their permanent
jobs) really are necessary to extract a fairer settlement offer from their
employer.
And that secret ballot feature to union strike decisions would reinforce
a point I made earlier. Congress should feel comfortable about replacing
protracted with prompt certification elections to make union representation
62. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
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more accessible to the fifteen million non-union employees who now want
it, because the key decisions made by the union (including contract
ratification) ultimately are made by the workers themselves. Indeed, there
should be a similar right of employees to vote about whether to accept the
employer's last contract offer or to ratify a negotiated settlement. And if
Congress were to restore the freedom of unions to negotiate with employers
a true requirement of membership in the union that represents all the
employees (and must do so fairly), then everybody in the unit must have
the right to vote in favor of a settlement or a strike.
After providing American workers with easier access to more
effective union representation, lawmakers should also feel comfortable
about rolling back the current "company union" restraint on EIPs created
by non-union employers. I am quite sure that a bipartisan reform package
that addressed these (and other) key issues on both sides of the labor-
management table would have much better political prospects for success
than what Congress has been debating (and filibustering) for the last
quarter century. More important, from a longer-term policy perspective
such comprehensive legislation would reflect a principled analysis of the
real needs of ordinary workers in the current labor market. Hopefully, in
their role as citizens, these employees will not only get out and vote, but
will also send the message to the candidates that they must start doing what
is necessary to enhance the world of work in this new century.
